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Abstract: Most papers regarding public goods have a certain predisposition to “classic aspects” 
like their characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. In this paper we try to emphasize that in the 
area of public goods one of the major problems is, in fact, the one of economic calculus. The reality is that 
public finances exist in a limited quantity so the public authority is forced to choose between ways to spend 
them. According to the definition of public goods the expenditures should be for the production of essential 
assets that are neglected by private investors. The problem is how to choose between public possibilities of 
spending the money after the application of the first criteria. 
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1.  PRELIMINARY IDEAS 
 
Generally, specialists consider that public goods are strictly necessary and that the state is 
their best provider (and often the only one assuming the production), because their production is not 
rentable for the private investors.  
  Starting  from  this,  if  we take  into account  the  fact  that  founds  for public spending are 
limited, some questions arise:  In what extent can be achieved an efficient distribution of public 
money?  How  can  money  be  directed  to  pressing  needs?  In  what  extent  money  spent  for 
development are used more efficiently in the public sector than in the private sector? 
Or, in other words: what provides the highest utility? Is the utility provided by public goods 
higher than the one of a smaller level of taxation
3? 
                                                                 
2 This work was supported by the the European Social Fund in  Romania, under the responsibility of the Managing 
Authority  for  the  Sectoral  Operational  Programme  for  Human  Resources  Development  2007-2013  [grant 
POSDRU/88/1.5/S/47646] 
3 A smaller level of taxation encourages the development of the private sector     
   C CE ES S   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er rs s, ,   I II I, ,   ( (2 2) ), ,   2 20 01 10 0      
38 
Leading  the discussion on,  we  could sift  to another aspect:  the problem of  intermediate 
public  goods. If  the result of public  investment consists of  intermediate  goods should they be 
available, for free, to manufacturers? 
2.  SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC GOODS 
 
According to Ferroni (2002) three interrelated characteristics of public goods emerge:  
  they generate a lot of externalities; 
  they are to a considerable degree “non-rivalrous” and “non-excludable”; 
  they create opportunities for the enhancement of welfare through collective action. 
The  major  defining  characteristic  of  a  public  good  (Brownstein,  1980)  is  that  the 
consumption of the good by one person does not reduce the amount available to any other person. 
The second major defining characteristic of a public good is that the costs of exclusion are high, so 
as to render pricing difficult. But he also states that there are no goods which are not non-rival in 
consumption. 
And according to Holocombe (1997) a public good is: 
o  a good that can be consumed by an additional consumer at no additional cost, and 
o  consumers cannot be excluded from consuming it. 
Holocombe  (1997)  also  underlined  that  goods  with  these  characteristics  will  be  under 
produced in the private sector, or may not be produced at all, following the conventional wisdom, 
so economic efficiency requires that the government forces people to contribute to the production of 
public goods
4, and then allow all citizens to consume them. 
As a whole the category of public goods is comprehensive; it includes from “classic goods” 
like roads or railways to goods of which we are not usually aware of being public like governance. 
Anyhow  the  classical  theory  of  public  goods  has  certain  problems.  Holocombe  (1997) 
underlines two problems regarding the traditional theory of public goods: 
-  many public goods are successfully produced in the private sector, so government is not 
really necessary; 
-  many of the goods government actually does produce do not correspond to the economist’s 
definition of public goods, so the theory does not explaining the government’s actual role in 
the economy. 
 
3.  THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC CALCULUS 
 
                                                                 
4 Higher level of taxation    
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  The problem of economic calculus  (in socialist countries)  was  first  underlined by Mises 
(2006) who clearly emphasized the fact that the prices can be formed only on the free market and 
that no central organism has a better alternative to establish them. Because the value of a good is 
relative and it is given by the quantity available for supply and by the demanded quantity. And if a 
public institution decides how to use a certain quantity of scarce resources it interferes with price 
formation and production on the free (real) market. 
In a  world of  imperfect  information, a central organism cannot possibly know the best 
alternative for using the scarce resources. 
If we would let the private entrepreneurs to freely use the scarce resources the decision of 
allocating the resources will be one of the market. 
Although  the  Austrian  economists  generally  considered  it
5  a  problem  of  the  socialist 
societies, we believe that it could be assigned to democratic societies. Even if we could say that in 
democratic  societies the prices are  formed on the  free  market, we encounter the problem of 
preference in the distribution of scarce resources (in the public sector). 
In the process regarding the production of a public good / service, the decision of allocating 
resources is taken in a “rude” way, by people, in key position, which “unfortunately” don’t have the 
ability to know everything about the market and it’s evolution on the long term. 
Are the reasons behind providing public goods enough to decide the use of scarce resources? 
Ideally, prices form on the free market. In the public goods case, although we don’t have a 
similar situation to one from a socialist system, there is a problem regarding the fact that decisions 
are  “unilateral” and prices do  not  form  naturally.  The result  is the  following one: with  no real 
prices
6 we cannot choose properly and we cannot estimate the real costs (just in some measure 
through comparison  with  free  market prices). So bec ause  the economic calculus  is  not  really 
possible in the public goods sector it’s fairly improbable, for a public decider, to make the best 
election. 
 
   
                                                                 
5 The problem of economic calculus 
6 Prices are the expression of the calculus result     
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4.  THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS IN EU 
 
In EU we don’t have only goods provided by member states to their citizens; we also have 
goods provided at a regional level by different states. Therefore we can speak about public goods at 
an international or regional level. 
They differ of national assets because in this case we speak about citizens from more than 
one state, we speak of international finances and of a distribution realized at a higher scale. 
According to Ferroni (2002) international public goods, and RPGs, include the knowledge, 
the regimes, and the standards and rules that are required to address cross-border problems or to 
engender desirable cross-border externalities; the institutions that monitor and enforce the rules and 
regimes; and the benefits that arise and are shared indiscriminately among countries. 
This definition implies that international and regional public goods come into two forms: 
intermediate and  final. Final  goods are broad outcomes or  manifestations of well-being  such as 
peace,  the  absence  of  extreme  poverty,  a  well-managed  physical  environment,  and  convergent 
international economic conditions capable of “lifting all boats”.  
Ferroni  (2002)  also  states  that  regional  goods  arise  when  individual  countries  induce 
beneficial cross-border spillover. Regional “bads” arise in the case of undesirable spillovers.  
Starting from the problem of public distribution an issue that concerns us is: how efficient 
are  the  criteria  for  distributing  resources  (for  public  goods)  in  the  European  Union?  How 
appropriate is the convergence criteria? What is the basis for it? Can we really consider it a solution 
to reduce the discrepancies between the different regions of EU? 
For the case of EU public goods become regional and the redistribution of money (for their 
production)  is  made  in  larger areas. That  is way the probability  that the tax payers enjoy  the 
benefices of their contribution is smaller.  
The situation  is quite different because  in a  country  tax payers  have a  larger chance  to 
benefit  of  the  roads,  railways,  schools  built  with  their  money.  We  could  even  say  that  the 
investments made in the public goods sector from a country contributes to the development of the 
private sector (e.g. infrastructure). 
Instead through massive redistribution, in the European Union, large amounts of money are 
directed to poor areas. And although this flow has not a decisive impact on competitiveness within 
the Union, the competitiveness poles are affected at an international scale and thus EU’s ability to 
compete with its tradition rivals China, Japan and US. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS     
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Public  finances  exist  in  a  limited  quantity  so  that  public  authority  is  forced  to  choose 
between ways to spend them. The impossibility to make economic calculus stops it to choose the 
best option.  
Hoppe  (1989)  stated  that  all  the  questions  regarding  public  goods  must  be  answered 
somehow because as long as there is scarcity and we do not live in the Garden of Eden, the time and 
money spent on one thing cannot be spent on another. The state has to answer these questions, too, 
although it does it without being subject to the profit-and-loss criterion. 
Clearly no public authority can take good decisions. Probably the best solution is the one 
provided by the liberal schools of economic thought, otherwise said, the provision of public goods 
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